Defense Education and Civilian University Research (DECUR)

An unprecedented level of economic interdependence complicates development of any U.S. strategy for competition with rivals like China or Russia. This heightened economic interdependence between allies and competitors alike both shapes the costs of military conflict and makes available new tools of economic statecraft and coercion. How can the United States and its allies strategically manage their common commercial ties to avoid vulnerabilities and achieve leverage against strategic competitors? How can the United States coordinate use of economic power with its strategic partners to achieve key interests while minimizing the likelihood of armed conflict, or at the least, minimizing the likelihood of American casualties? More broadly, to what extent and under what conditions can tools of economic statecraft supplement or even supplant military power and reduce lethal risk to U.S. military personnel?

Our research aims to answer these questions by creating new insights focused on three areas: (1) exploring the ways in which asymmetric interdependence in investments and financial flows shape states’ power and vulnerability with respect to economic coercion; (2) defining the ways interdependence complicates cooperation and coordination among allies; and (3) creating a country-specific decision-guidance framework to help defense policy makers evaluate economic statecraft tools with respect to China and Russia.