Principal Investigator: Dr. Erik Gartzke

Co-PI: Dr. Jon R. Lindsay

Sponsors:

• Department of Defense

• Minerva Initiative

• Office of Naval Research

Award Number: N00014-14-0071

Abstract: Deterrence as a strategy and doctrine was convincingly and effectively deployed by the United States during the Cold War. Today, however, states face a widening range of destabilizing threats, in particular to space, cyberspace, financial, and other critical infrastructure. The interconnectedness of the contemporary world creates many new opportunities for state or non-state adversaries to seek asymmetric advantages (i.e., low-cost actions which undermine high-cost sources of power) against advanced industrial countries, including the United States. Technological and political complexity generates tremendous uncertainty, undermining in one stroke both the simple logic of the basic deterrence frameworks applied in the previous era and also the credibility of such efforts. “Cross domain deterrence”

(CDD) seeks to counter threats in one arena (such as space or cyber warfare) by relying on different types of capabilities (such as sea power or nuclear weapons, or even non-military tools such as access to markets or normative regimes) where deterrence may be more effective. The increasing complexity of

CDD poses both opportunities and challenges that necessitate, and will benefit from, a major evolution in thinking (and practice) about how deterrence operates.

The University of California Center for Peace and security (cPASS), in collaboration with the Lawrence Livermore (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL), aims to develop analytical clarity concerning the effects of increasing technological and political complexity on the logic of CDD. We combat the complexity of CDD by breaking the concept into three complementary characteristics of the global political system: asymmetry, interdependence, and multipolarity. These interrelated concepts are strongly affected but not uniquely determined by emerging technologies. They build on one another in a modular yet cumulative process which will enable us to systematically explore key questions such as: How does asymmetric access to nuclear weapons, counterspace operations, and cyberspace capabilities shape threats and the use of force? How does politicaleconomic and technological interdependence affect strategic calculations and a willingness to fight or compromise? How does the proliferation of diverse types of weapons to a growing number of actors shape the nature of deterrence or alter its scope? Answers to these questions promise to advance the social science of national security and inform policy for tackling emerging cross-domain threats.

DECUR Project Title: Economic Interdependence and National Security in the 21st Century

An unprecedented level of economic interdependence complicates development of any U.S. strategy for competition with rivals like China or Russia. This heightened economic interdependence between allies and competitors alike both shapes the costs of military conflict and makes available new tools of economic statecraft and coercion. How can the United States and its allies strategically manage their common commercial ties to avoid vulnerabilities and achieve leverage against strategic competitors? How can the United States coordinate use of economic power with its strategic partners to achieve key interests while minimizing the likelihood of armed conflict, or at the least, minimizing the likelihood of American casualties? More broadly, to what extent and under what conditions can tools of economic statecraft supplement or even supplant military power and reduce lethal risk to U.S. military personnel?

Our research aims to answer these questions by creating new insights focused on three areas: (1) exploring the ways in which asymmetric interdependence in investments and financial flows shape states’ power and vulnerability with respect to economic coercion; (2) defining the ways interdependence complicates cooperation and coordination among allies; and (3) creating a country-specific decision-guidance framework to help defense policy makers evaluate economic statecraft tools with respect to China and Russia.

Contributors:

PME Principle Investigator:                                            
David Sacko, Professor, United States Air Force Academy

Civilian Principle Investigator: 
Erik Gartzke, Professor, University of California at San Diego

Co-Investigators:
Jack Zhang, Assistant Professor, University of Kansas
Ben Graham, Associate Professor, University of Southern California
Neil Narang, Associate Professor, University of California at Santa Barbara
Paul Bolt, Department Head, Professor of Political Science, United States Air Force Academy

Learn more about this project here.

Principal Investigator: Dr. Erik Gartzke

Co-PI: Dr. Jon R. Lindsay

Sponsors:

• Department of Defense

• Minerva Initiative

• Office of Naval Research

Award Number: N00014-15-1-2792

Abstract: The rise of new technological capabilities and concerns involving space and cyberspace create a pressing need for a better understanding of how conflict and cooperation are conducted across different domains, and where crossing domains creates special challenges and opportunities for deterrence, compellence and other forms of influence. We have now encountered a number of nuanced cases of complex deterrence involving many means, so many that a purely qualitative approach to empirical analysis is no longer the only approach to historical data.

 We have identified existing datasets that we are enhancing to incorporate information about capabilities and interaction in and across various domains.  Conducting innovative tests of cross-domain crises and conflict also necessitates the development of new variables to capture the increase in complexity associated with technological innovation. Finally, we have a new measure of how uncertainty about a state’s capabilities varies across domains. These data promise new insights into the way cross-domain deterrence operates in the real world.

A variety of innovative technologies are changing the nature of warfare. These technologies have contrasting effects, depending on how they interact with the political processes of states. Technologies that supplant human labor in battle—such as UAVs (drones) and ground combat robots—lower military labor costs and limit political risks associated with friendly casualties. The tendency should thus be for military automation to increase the scope of threats or uses of force by the most advanced economies, geographically and in terms of the issues in dispute. These and other insights have been developed in a theoretical paper and in a quantitative study of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan.

Technologies that do not replace humans on the battlefield, but which instead make defense more effective should have the opposite effect, reducing aggression by other states or actors against the technological power. In two separate studies—one on the effects of nuclear weapons platform diversification on deterrence success and a second addressing the impact of military surveillance satellites—these technologies enhance deterrence or defense, making aggression less effective and lowering the costs/risks associated with national security. These capabilities also substitute to some extent for a forward force posture, reducing the need for costly foreign basing.

The United States faces key questions of foreign policy efficacy and tradeoffs between its national priorities in a period of relative decline. How (and where) can the United States deploy its military capabilities to best achieve security and maintain influence, while minimizing costs? A series of cPASS studies explore these questions. First, we examine the classical conception of military deployments as “tripwires,” showing that a more accurate empirical description involves signals of U.S. priorities and resolve. It is not how many forces are deployed to an ally that matters for general deterrence success, but what proportion of available U.S. forces are deployed in a given country. The finding also suggests that relative U.S. decline need not undermine global stability, provided that America telegraphs its priorities, implying a policy of restraint combined with a limited forward force posture.

The question of whether forward force postures stabilize or inflame is examined in the next study. Work by cPASS finds that the proportion of U.S. forces deployed to an ally significantly correlates with reduced challenges by an ally’s rivals. Finally, we critically examine the effect of presence versus offshore balancing. It would be appealing to be able to protect security partners from abroad. However, we find that forces near, but not on the territory of an ally actually undermine stability. It turns out that “being there” makes a difference for deterrence success.